MARINE accident investigators have identified 14 safety issues which they say directly contributed to the fatal capsizing of a tug off Greenock last year.

A Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation into the sinking of the tug Biter while it was towing the passenger vessel Hebridean Princess towards Greenock’s James Watt Dock last year was published earlier today.

Tug master George Taft, 65, from Greenock, and deckhand Ian Catterson, 73, of Millport, were onboard when the vessel capsized in less than 10 seconds, and were unable to escape.


READ MORE: Greenock tug tragedy accident report published by MAIB


The Clyde Marine Services vessel was working alongside another tug, Bruiser, at the time of the accident and had been attempting a ‘peel off/drop back’ manouevre.

The MAIB’s report found that Biter ‘girted’ and capsized because it was unable to reverse direction to operate directly astern of the Hebridean Princess before the tug’s weight came on to the towing bridle.

When this occurred, the tug’s ‘gob rope’ - a type of rigging used to prevent a tug from capsizing – did not prevent it from being towed sideways, as it should have.

In their post-accident investigations, the MAIB found that a section of this rope had melted and fused to part of the vessel which would have been near its ‘samson post’.

Photographs from the report indicate that the preferred method of securing the tug’s ‘gob rope’ was to wrap it around the port side samson post before attaching locking turns to it.

It is believed the rendering of the rope occurred due to the friction of the rope being rapidly pulled around this post during the incident.

As a result of this rendering, Biter became trapped and was unable to manoeuvre, causing it to be pulled sideways and be subject to ‘girting’ forces.

(Image: Marine Accident Investigation Branch) The MAIB says it has not been possible to determine why Biter’s gob rope rendered, however, they have noted that the practice of securing the rob rope to a samson post was ‘untested’.

They also state that the configuration of this rope increased the tug’s vulnerability to being towed sideways and girted.

Due to the tug’s rapid capsize, investigators say it is likely that the crew did not have time to activate the vessel’s emergency tow release mechanism.

(Image: Marine Accident Investigation Branch) The investigation also found Hebridean Princess’s speed of 4.6 knots (kts) meant the load on Biter’s towlines was between two and five times more than it would have been at the recommended lower speed of 2-3kts.

The higher speed meant that there was significant load on the gob rope securing arrangement, which the MAIB’s report says ‘almost certainly’ contributed to the gob rope rendering and the subsequent girting.

Investigators found an open accommodation hatch compromised the tug’s watertight integrity and limited the crew’s chance of survival, as it was highly unlikely any air was trapped in the wheelhouse when the vessel tipped over.

A warning sign next to the hatch which read ‘KEEP CLOSED AT SEA’ was obscured when the hatch was opened.

(Image: Marine Accident Investigation Branch) The report also found master/pilot and pilot/tug exchanges were incomplete and, with no shared understanding of the plan for towing the small cruise ship, the Hebridean Princess’s master and the tug masters were unable to challenge the marine pilot’s intentions in time to avert the tragedy.

Opportunities to question the pilot’s plan and in particular to highlight the need to limit the vessel’s speed during their manoeuvres are said to have been missed.

At the time of the accident, the Hebridean Princess was being steered by a marine pilot provided by the Clyde's statutory harbour authority Clydeport. 

The report found that the Clydeport marine pilot's training had not adequately prepared them to work with conventional tugs such as Biter.

Among the other issues identified by the MAIB with the Clydeport pilot’s understanding of the situation was their flawed belief that Biter, a conventional tug, was operating in the same manner as an azimuth stern drive (ASD) vessel.

(Image: Marine Accident Investigation Branch)

The pilot had taken part in 185 trips prior to the accident, of which 23 per cent employed tugs.

But only two had employed conventional tugs assisting with ‘dead ship’ tows, and both of those trips were supervised.

This meant that Hebridean Princess’s pilot had not previously witnessed the peel off/drop back manoeuvre attempted by Biter, and that the pilot’s trip on Hebridean Princess was their first unsupervised pilotage act employing conventional tugs for ship assist towage.

A spokesperson for Clyde Marine Services said: “We acknowledge the release of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) report.

"We will take time to review and consider it.

"Our thoughts remain with the families affected and Clyde Marine Services will continue to cooperate fully with ongoing official investigations.”

Jim McSporran, port director at Clydeport, said: “We note the findings from the MAIB report and will consider its recommendations in detail.

"Above all, our deepest sympathy goes to the families, friends and colleagues of the two men who died in this tragic incident.

"The health, safety and the welfare of our employees and the third parties we work with is, and always will be, our number one priority.”

A spokesperson for Hebridean Island Cruises said: "Our thoughts and deepest sympathies remain with the families and friends of George Taft and Ian Catterson.

"We welcome the Report from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch into the tragic incident which took place on 24th February 2023 and express our appreciation for their diligent efforts.

"We acknowledge the information contained within the Report and support the recommendations made to best ensure that an accident of this nature is never repeated.

"The safety and wellbeing of everyone aboard our vessels and all involved in our maritime operations is always our top priority."